Notes

1. The important question, which I am deliberately skipping in this short introduction, runs in the opposite direction: Could we coherently conceive of a class of representational systems that only knows the world under theoretical propositional representations, never having had any kind of subjective experience? In other words, Could the epistemic projects of science and philosophy, at least in principle, be successfully pursued by an unconscious race of machines? Or are even the meaning and the truth of scientific theories ultimately constituted by the fact that they are generated in groups of phenomenal subjects—systems that also know the world (and themselves) under phenomenal representations?

2. In philosophy of mind, the concept of supervenience stands for an attempt to formulate a coherent and nonreductive form of materialism, capturing the essential theoretical intuitions behind many previous strategies for solving the mind-body problem. For the concept of supervenience, see Kim 1993. For an excellent and accessible introduction to philosophy of mind, well suited for empirical researchers and other non-philosophers, see Kim 1996.

3. Here the classical position is Thomas Huxley's. For a recent exposition of problems surrounding the notion of epiphenomenalism, see Bieri 1992. Herbert Feigl saw the problem of introducing "nomological danglers," a new class of psychophysical laws "dangling out of'' the closed causal network of the physical world, as early as 1960: "These correspondence laws are peculiar in that they may be said to postulate 'effects' (mental states as dependent variables) which by themselves do not function, or at least do not seem to be needed, as 'causes' (independent variables) for any observable behaviour'' (Feigl 1960: 37).

4. See Feigl 1958; for a collection of texts regarding early identity theory, see Borst 1970.

5. Regarding formal and semantic difficulties of the identity theory, see Kripke 1971, 1972; for the more influential ''multiple realization argument'' see Putnam 1975, 1992; for a brief introduction to functionalism Block 1980. A good way to enter the current debate is Kim 1998. Important edited collections are Borst 1970; Heil and Mele 1993; Lycan 1990; Warner and Szubka 1994.

6. See Bock and Marsh 1993; Cohen and Schooler 1997; Davies and Humphreys 1993; Marcel and Bisiach 1988; Milner and Rugg 1992 for edited collections. Examples of important individual contributions are Shallice 1988; Weiskrantz 1997; see also the references to monographs given in the introductions to individual parts of this book.

7. An excellent, recent introduction is Giïzeldere 1997. For substantial encyclopedia articles, containing further references, see Diemer 1971; Grauman 1966; Landesman 1967; Lormand 1998; Metzinger and Schumacher 1999; NN 1904.

Was this article helpful?

0 0

Post a comment